Abstract—Efficient spectrum allocation is a vital contributor
to economic growth and success in telecommunications industry
management of a country. Thailand’s telecommunications
industry is different from most cases since prior to the
establishment of the telecommunications regulator, Thai
telecommunications industry operated on the basis of
concessionaire regime and not the licensing regime. Due to the
complex nature of the concessionaire regime and the Thai
legislation, supply of spectrum could not be injected into the
telecommunications industry for more than a decade before
spectrum allocation in October 2012. National Broadcasting
and Telecommunication Organization Act (2010), Article 45
specifies that the regulator must allocate spectrum via means of
spectrum auction only. Spectrum Auction is not a “one size fits
all” and should be specifically designed to achieve objectives
that is suitable to the country depending on telecommunications
market structure and in most cases should prioritize long-term
valuable economic and social benefits over short-term revenue
maximization. The first part of this research provides literature
on mobile broadband and spectrum auctions. The second part
of this research provides an account of the Thai
Telecommunications industry and specific 2.1 GHz spectrum
auction objectives and outcomes. The final part of this research
provides a qualitative analysis concluding that 2.1 GHz
spectrum auction has fulfilled the policy objectives as
prescribed by the NBTC Organization Act (2010) and is
consistent with that of the international standard.
Index Terms—2.1 GHz band, mobile broadband, reserve
price, spectrum auction, spectrum cap, spectrum management.
Navneet Madan is with the National Broadcasting and
Telecommunications Commission, Thailand (e-mail:
navneet.nbtc@gmail.com).
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Cite: Settapong Malisuwan, Wassana Kaewphanuekrungsi, Navneet Madan, and Jesada Sivaraks, "Analysis of 2.1 GHz Spectrum Auction in Thailand," Journal of Economics, Business and Management vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 591-598, 2015.