— India has embarked upon an ambitious nuclear energy expansion programme in accordance with which, it has passed The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Bill 2010. This act has been rife with speculation owing to the liability concerns of the operators and the suppliers, with the suppliers being hesitant to invest in nuclear energy due to fear of incurring liability. The paper revolves around the Indo –Russian nuclear agreement while discussing certain relevant provisions of the aforementioned act. It also provides a general overview of the current international liability regime and the present national legislation, analysing the economic efficiency of the latter. While discussing the merits and criticisms of the Agreement and the Act, we have provided a basic model for affixing liability in line with the absolute liability principle while also incorporating a game theoretical perspective and indifference curve approach by which we aim to develop a comprehensive nuclear liability regime based on sound law and economic principles. In our conclusion, we sum up the main points of our liability model while also pointing out which provisions of the Act and the said Agreement are economically efficient, and accordingly which provisions should be kept and what other provisions should be included if necessary.
— Absolute liability, game theory and insurance model, Slutsky substitution effect, nuclear liability regime.
The authors are with the Gujarat National Law University, India (e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com).
Cite: Ifrah Shaikh and Swati Bisen, " The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act 2010 – A Detour from the International Regime," Journal of Economics, Business and Management vol. 3, no. 12, pp. 1152-1158, 2015.